Hey Hey Hey…Whether explained with exuberant ebonics or with the solemnity of a sophomore philosopher, these insights are truly inspiring in the worst sense of the word….
Old line thinking to justify a failure of accomplishment….
broadcast on Egyptian television…one of our allies…?
In the ongoing case of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh’s assassination, culpability can be narrowed based on access to information. Who would have risked the unusually vast resources expended in this operation without advance information sufficient to elicit contingent approval? Mabhouh willingly embarked on an itinerary assigned to him by trusted, familiar handlers; an itinerary designed to result in his eradication. Over the last two years, Mabhouh had suffered two attempts on his life. He was no dummy when it came to his own comfort level. Stratfor has previously documented the extent of the Iranian intelligence network operating in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria. Knowing who controls this netherworld of Hamas and Hezbollah makes it easier to deduce the most probable origin of the operation. Mabhouh had no reason to suspect that his hotel room assignment was predetermined. Yet, the fact that his room was located in an area blind to video surveillance and the coincident ability of the hit team to locate itself directly across from his room reveals both the coordinated agenda and the duplicitous nature of Mabhouh’s orders. This event clearly betrays itself in the magnitude of expended effort. Effort that, without preoperative information, would not have been deemed a reasonable risk. And that’s the point, there was very little risk compared to the very large benefits. One, al-Mabhouh would finally be removed from the payroll while, two, generating a classic “blame the enemy” opportunity. An appropriation of Stalin’s simple lesson as applied by the Ayatollah Ahmadinejad Khamenei.
The immediate release of information and videotapes regarding Mabhouh’s cause of death is simply an elongated ruse to cover the team’s ultimate failure to successfully “execute” their assignment. Suffocation and electric shock purported as causes of death are techniques taken straight from the jihadist curriculum of death which seem incongruent in this case. We reason that Mabhouh violently resisted the dose of succinylcholine that was intended to untraceably stop his heart. Then, facing a noisy fight with Mabhouh, the three assassins resorted to suffocation to accomplish the task, calculating that the combination of complexity, conspicuousness, and credit cards issued in the name of Payoneer, would ultimately provide sufficient cover.
The Stratfor Article
Iranian Weapons interdicted on the way to the Hezzis:
The recent assassination of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh reveals to us that Hamas never wastes an opportunity to create a martyr of whomever it has decided to kill. With revenge for Mabhouh’s murder of Ilan Saadon as the motive, a clumsy team of Hamas operatives was dispatched to Dubai by their Iranian handlers to eliminate Mabhouh who had entered the country under a false passport on an assignment to procure weapons for Gaza. When did Dubai become a center of weapons trade? With whom was Mabhouh scheduled to meet? An opportunity such as this, to discover and eliminate a covert supply of weapons represents a target of significantly greater value to the alleged perpetrators than Mabhouh as an individual. Thus, revenge as the proposed motive fails to agree with Mossad as the proposed perpetrator. The scenario is irrational in light of the larger benefit contained in its construction. It is far more credible to see this as an internal action in which Mabhouh was forwarded by Syria for his execution by Hamas in an operation designed by Iran to exploit windfall propaganda out of what otherwise would have been another run of the mill intra-Hamas murder. The selected location, the byzantine structure of the thing and the excessive number of people involved indicates that the real success of this mission was its conspicuousness. There are chapters remaining in the design of the scenario’s play out, such as implicating the US, etc. They’re just gravy to tempt a gullible press. We’ll see….
In 1970, under expertly applied political pressure, President Nixon developed an exit strategy to the war in Vietnam based on the idea that communist aggression could be effectively countered through “Vietnamization.” This strategy was contingent on the belief that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had both the resolve and the ammunition to resist the aggression of the North Vietnam People’s Army, the NVA. They had the ammunition, they didn’t have the resolve. Also, they were completely infiltrated by NVA intelligence agents. By knowing western plans in advance, the NVA was able to avoid large scale suicidal confrontations and instead conduct debilitating small scale raids against betrayed forces clearly superior to their own.
Fast forward to Afghanistan. To what extent do you believe the west is able to infiltrate the army of the Taliban? To what extent do you believe the army of the Taliban is able to infiltrate the army of Afghanistan? How often will the west know of the Taliban’s planned movements and intentions versus the Taliban’s knowledge of the west’s? Regardless of troop numbers, winning this conflict is primarily contingent on intelligence. If we have it, we will. If we don’t, we won’t.
Sadly, it looks like we’ll have to delete our link to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s “personal memos” blog. His plug has, apparently, been pulled, as it were. This is, on one hand, a shame as you will have a hard time finding a more stridently tautological collection of ruminations available in English on the web. On the other hand, since his last entry was posted in December of 2007, there just wasn’t much “there” there (sorry Gertrude). We’ll miss having that little glimpse into his different sort of thinking…and we’ll miss access to his antithetic style of writing that was, in terms of sartorial splendor, more than the equal of his wardrobe.