“ARVN” vs. “The Taliban”…the cage match in the desert

In 1970,  under expertly applied  political pressure, President Nixon developed an exit strategy to the  war in Vietnam based on the  idea  that communist aggression  could be effectively countered through  “Vietnamization.”   This strategy was contingent on the belief  that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had both the resolve  and the ammunition to resist the aggression of the North Vietnam People’s Army, the NVA.   They had the ammunition, they didn’t have the resolve.  Also, they were completely infiltrated by NVA intelligence agents.  By knowing western plans in advance, the NVA was able to avoid large scale suicidal confrontations and instead conduct debilitating small scale  raids against betrayed forces  clearly superior to their own.

Fast forward to Afghanistan.  To what extent do you believe the west is able to  infiltrate the army of the Taliban?  To what extent do you believe the army of the Taliban is able to infiltrate the army of Afghanistan?   How often will the west know of  the Taliban’s planned movements and intentions versus the Taliban’s knowledge of the west’s?   Regardless of troop numbers, winning this conflict is primarily contingent on intelligence.   If we have it, we will.  If we don’t, we won’t.